In a nuclear tender, the EIP, AIP and defined requirements must be identified, linked together and traced through to the response. The point is not to spot three acronyms in a file, but to understand which requirements apply to an item or an activity important for protection, and then what they imply for the service. For a bidder, a structured analysis of the tender documents makes it possible to distinguish the technical, quality and safety requirements that truly determine contract performance.
What do EIP, AIP and defined requirements mean in a nuclear tender?
EIPs refer to elements important for protection, AIPs to activities important for protection, and defined requirements to what those elements or activities must comply with. These concepts are defined in Article 1.3 of the Order of 7 February 2012 laying down the general rules applicable to basic nuclear installations, known as the INB Order. The protection concerned is not limited to nuclear safety: it covers all the interests mentioned in Article L. 593-1 of the Environmental Code, i.e. public security, health and sanitation, as well as the protection of nature and the environment.
An EIP is a structure, equipment, a system (scheduled or not), hardware, a component, or software present in the facility or placed under the operator’s responsibility, which performs a function necessary for the demonstration provided for in Article L. 593-7 of the Environmental Code or which verifies that this function is performed. An AIP is an activity that contributes to the technical or organizational arrangements of this demonstration, or that is likely to affect them.
A defined requirement is assigned to an EIP so that it performs the intended function with the expected characteristics, or to an AIP so that it meets its objectives. The Practical Guide for Suppliers published by ASNR in 2025 provides examples. For an EIP: the thickness of a pipe, the closing time of a valve, or the flow rate of a pump. For an AIP: a dimension during machining, a tightening torque during assembly, a welding parameter, or the use of an inspector holding COFREND certification. The logic to keep in mind therefore starts from the item: an EIP performs a function, this function imposes defined requirements, the activities likely to affect these requirements are AIPs, and each AIP calls for its own requirements and inspections.
How can you identify the EIP, AIP, and defined requirements in the DCE?
You must look for the obligations that qualify an item, an activity, or an expected outcome, then retain their documentary context. In a nuclear file, this information may be spread across the statement of work, technical specifications, quality appendices, plans, and contractual requirements. The INB order requires the operator to identify the EIPs and their defined requirements, as well as the AIPs and the defined requirements associated with them.
| Item | To be looked up in the DCE | Impact on the bid |
|---|---|---|
| EIP | Equipment, system, hardware, component, or software identified as important for protection | Link the defined requirements and the expected evidence |
| AIP | Design, manufacturing, assembly, or inspection activity likely to affect an EIP | Identify the arrangements for execution, inspection, and traceability |
| Defined requirement | Characteristic or condition assigned to an EIP or an AIP | Show how the bid makes it possible to comply with it |
| Technical inspection | Provision enabling verification that an AIP has been properly carried out | Identify the control, the person responsible, and the expected evidence |
ASNR specifies that it does not establish a list of SAs, because each manufacturing process is specific. Identification depends on the equipment, its function, and the activities likely to affect its characteristics. The bidder must therefore avoid turning the search for SSCs and SAs into a simple keyword scan.
How do you structure the analysis of a nuclear tender?
The most robust method is to turn the file into a requirements matrix linked to sources, responsibilities, and response elements (the creation of a requirements matrix based on a CCTP is detailed in a dedicated article). In a nuclear bid package, the matrix adds specific columns: SSC or SA concerned, defined requirement, technical inspection, expected evidence, and any subcontractor. This structure prevents a technical requirement from being separated from the quality obligation or the inspection associated with it.
- Identify each requirement and its source. Keep the original document, section, and paragraph.
- Qualify the requirement. Distinguish technical, quality, safety, documentary, and contractual requirements, then identify those linked to an EIP, an AIP, or a defined requirement.
- Link dependencies. Associate expected characteristics, the activities concerned, controls, competencies, and supporting documents.
- Assign responsibility. Allocate the analysis to the right discipline: engineering, quality, safety, manufacturing, or bid team.
- Match the response with the evidence. Determine the document, procedure, or supporting document that will demonstrate compliance with the requirement.
- Carry out a coverage review. Each requirement must have a clear status before submission: covered, partially covered, to be completed, or to be decided.
This method does not decide in place of experts whether an activity constitutes an SA. It organizes the information to enable the relevant disciplines to define the scope, verify commitments, and quickly find the source of each requirement.
What must a bidder check before submitting its offer?
The bidder must check that they understand the applicable requirements, that they can comply with them, and that they will be able to demonstrate control of them during performance. When equipment is classified as EIP, the operator provides the corresponding defined requirements. For design and manufacturing activities, the supplier specifies the AIP based on their knowledge of the processes; the operator generally validates them.
Subcontracting does not break this chain. The supplier passes on to its subcontractor the defined requirements associated with the AIPs it entrusts to them. The operator remains responsible for overseeing all AIPs, regardless of the level of subcontracting (Article 2.2.2 of the INB order), and cannot delegate this oversight to a service provider (Article 2.2.3). Each AIP is also subject to a technical inspection carried out by people different from those who performed it (Article 2.5.3). Before committing, five questions must therefore be settled: is the requirement understood? who is responsible for it? is an AIP involved? is a subcontractor involved? what evidence will make it possible to demonstrate compliance with the requirement?
How does Specgen analyze the requirements of a nuclear tender?
Specgen is a French artificial intelligence platform for complex technical tenders, with one solution for bidders and another for buyers. It analyzes the tender dossier, extracts and structures requirements, searches internal knowledge that the user is authorized to access, assists with drafting in existing documents, and checks the compliance of the response. It can be deployed on-premises or air-gapped, with no external AI API and no outbound data flows, for sensitive sectors: industry, energy, defense, sovereign functions, operators of vital importance (OIV).
For a nuclear tender, Specgen can structure the requirements extracted from the package while preserving their documentary reference, so that the bid, engineering, and quality teams can qualify them and prepare their response. The page AI for nuclear and energy tenders presents the platform’s use cases for this sector. Specgen does not make a regulatory determination of an SSC or an SA in place of the responsible experts. For constraints specific to classified files, see our article on the IGI 1300 et l’IA dans les appels d’offres défense.
A a demonstration can be carried out on the structure of a file representative of the organization’s bidding process.
FAQ : EIP, AIP et appels d’offres nucléaire
What is the difference between an EIP and an AIP?
An EIP is an item (equipment, system, hardware, component or software) that performs a function necessary to demonstrate the protection of the facility, or that verifies that it is ensured. An AIP is an activity that contributes to this protection or is likely to affect it. Both are associated with defined requirements provided for by the INB Order of 7 February 2012.
Who identifies SSCs and SAs in the nuclear sector?
The operator identifies the EIPs and their defined requirements. For design and manufacturing activities, the supplier specifies the AIPs based on its knowledge of its processes, and the operator generally validates them. The ASNR does not establish a list of AIPs, as each manufacturing process is specific.
Is a defined requirement necessarily technical?
No. A defined requirement may concern a characteristic of equipment, but also the conditions for carrying out an activity, an inspection, or a competency required to perform it. What characterizes it is its link to an EIP or an AIP and to the relevant protection objective.
How should EIP and AIP requirements be handled in a tender?
Their source must be retained, their link with the relevant elements and activities identified, their analysis assigned to the competent disciplines, and the expected evidence determined. For subcontracted activities, the supplier passes on the relevant defined requirements to its subcontractor; oversight of all AIPs remains the responsibility of the operator.
Key takeaways
EIPs, AIPs, and defined requirements should not be analyzed as isolated keywords in a nuclear call for tenders. Their value comes from the links between the item concerned, the expected function, the activities likely to affect it, and the requirements to be met. For a bidder, the quality of the analysis relies on traceability between the DCE, internal responsibilities, the proposed response, and the expected supporting evidence. Rigorous structuring facilitates review by the quality, safety, and engineering teams without replacing their regulatory judgment.
Sources
Decree of 7 February 2012 laying down the general rules relating to basic nuclear installations, Articles 1.3, 2.2.2, 2.2.3 and 2.5.3
Environmental Code, Articles L. 593-1 and L. 593-7
ASNR, Practical guide for suppliers: design and manufacturing requirements for equipment intended for nuclear installations (2025)
Specgen